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The purpose of this paper is to discuss how experiencing virtual violence might lead to changes in 
our moral judgments through a process of rational deliberation. This perspective is proposed as a 
complementary alternative to the dominant tendency in current research to exclusively focus on 
how virtual violence affects our emotions as behavioural dispositions. I will propose and consider a 
rationalist, descriptive account that is based on sound principles for case-based reasoning. The 
controversial notion of ‘virtual rape’ will be used as an example of how the rationalist and emotivist 
accounts ask fundamentally different questions  and how the proposed account can yield an 
increased understanding of how experiences in virtual worlds can change our moral judgments. 
This approach can, in turn, yield increased understanding of how games and virtual worlds ought to 
be designed in order to foster rational deliberation. The ultimate aim of this paper is to make a plea 
for increased focus on rational deliberation in virtual world research, which calls for increased 









Do we reach moral judgments on the basis of conscious rational deliberation or intuitive emotions 
– and to what extent does moral deliberation determine our actual behaviour? This age-old 
question, sometimes described in terms of emotivist versus rationalist theories of moral judgment, 
has been subject to heated debate in philosophy, psychology and other disciplines. It lies at the 
heart of ethics in the sense that moral rules and principles seem redundant if our judgments are 
primarily dictated by more or less instinctive emotions. Whether or not we subscribe to a 
rationalist or emotivist theory of moral judgment also determines how we approach a number of 
other problems. In this paper, I will focus on how it determines what kinds of questions we ask with 
regard to changes in our moral judgments following certain experiences – experiences of virtual 
violence in particular. By ‘virtual violence’ I mean engaging in or witnessing acts of simulated 
violence in interactive computer-generated environments. A typical case would be a virtual 
environment in which you witness or perform simulated acts of murder, torture or rape – or if a 
representation of you (your avatar) is being the victim of such acts. If our moral judgments are 
primarily motivated by our emotions, the crucial question becomes: how might our emotional 
dispositions change as a result of experiencing virtual violence? If our judgments are primarily 
motivated by reason, the crucial question becomes: how might our reasoning change as a result of 
experiencing virtual violence? The vast majority of claims regarding the effects of virtual violence, 
by researchers as well as journalists and policymakers, seem to take for granted that virtual 
violence changes our emotions – and rational deliberation is usually left out of the picture.1 
In focusing on effects on reasoning in addition to effects on emotions, our accounts of the 
effects of virtual violence could become less deterministic, more acknowledging of the intellectual 
capabilities of users, and lead to a more nuanced and less polarized debate. More pragmatically, it 
seems unlikely that games and virtual worlds will be purged of violence, so a better understanding 
of how our reasoning might change because of virtual violence could allow developers to 
counteract such effects by adding elements that foster deliberation, instead of removing virtual 
violence. For instance, if it is illusory to expect first-person shooters to disappear from the market, 
we could focus on how such violence ought to be portrayed in order to trigger deliberation in the 
player. In other words, it is not my aim to contribute to what Killen and Smetana has referred to as 
the pitting of “’cold, hard, logical reasoning’ against ‘hot, intuitive, emotions’ *and+ a dichotomized 
and often stereotyped portrayal of emotions versus moral cognition”(2005, p. 481) , but rather 
make a plea for a closer integration of rationalist and emotivist accounts of the effects of virtual 
violence.  
In this paper, I will use the controversial notion of ‘virtual rape’ to illustrate how virtual 
violence might affect our moral judgments through a process of rational deliberation, and I will use 
casuistics, or principles for sound case-based reasoning, as a descriptive model of such moral 
reasoning. Before turning to the outline of this model and its applicability to virtual violence, I will 
first discuss some problems with emotivist claims about the effects of virtual violence. 
 
SOME PROBLEMS WITH EMOTIVIST CLAIMS ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF VIRTUAL VIOLENCE 
If our moral judgments result from more or less instinctive emotions, it is difficult to answer 
questions regarding the effects of virtual violence in any other way than by external observation – 
such as experiments and surveys. A number of such studies have been done and to some degree 
“the scientific debate about whether exposure to media violence causes aggressive behaviour is 
over ... and should have been over 30 years ago” (Anderson, Gentile, & Buckley, 2007, p. 4). 
Although the studies do clearly show that exposure to virtual violence causes a greater risk for 
aggressive and immoral behaviour, there are clearly a number of factors that determine individual 
differences –illustrated by the fact that the vast majority of those who engage in extreme acts of 
virtual violence do not carry this behaviour into the real word. According to the ‘risk and resilience’ 
perspective in psychology, there are a number of factors that “protect” many of us from ‘risk 
exposure’.  Although rational cognition is usually counted as one contributing factor, for instance as 
part of ‘present internal states’ in the influential General Aggression Model employed by many 
researchers (cf. Anderson et al., 2007, pp. 40-58), one purpose of this paper is to argue that 
rational deliberation should be counted as the most important of these factors. Indeed, this 
individual, rational ‘resilience’ can be seen as one of the main sources of the methodological 
problems that plague many of these experiments. In other words, rational deliberation is arguably 
the most important cause for why the following problems prohibit a straightforward causal 
explanation of the effects of virtual violence: 
 
1. Correlation is not causation: In many studies, a significant correlation has been found between 
violent behaviour and playing video games (cf. Anderson & Dill, 2000). This kind of correlation 
has also been emphasized by the media with regard to both the Virginia Tech. and Columbine 
tragedies. One of the biggest (although probably over-emphasized) problems in psychological 
experiments is of course that correlation does not imply causation. If a significant correlation is 
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 Interestingly, what seems to be a neglect of reason in psychological research on the effects of virtual violence stands in 
stark contrast to Haidt’s claim that modern psychological research on moral judgment has generally been dominated by 
rationalist models (Haidt, 2001). Haidt points out that psychology embraced emotivist accounts in the late 19th century, as 
exemplified by the dethroning of rationality found in psychoanalysis and behaviourism. This paradigm was then trumped 
by the influence of explicit rationalists Kohlberg and Piaget, an influence that still holds in most areas of experimental 
psychology according to Haidt. 
found, this correlation can be due to 1) playing violent games and being a violent person could 
both stem from a shared cause, or 2) being a violent person in the first place might lead to 
playing more violent video games, not the other way around. This is a point that has been 
raised ad nauseam as a rebuttal of virtual violence research, but it is still a severe obstacle. 
2. Expectancy effects: It is difficult to conceal the purpose of these experiments. If a subject is 
exposed to virtual violence and is then placed in a laboratory setting where it is possible to 
display acts of violence, he or she can easily figure out the purpose of the experiment and act in 
strict accordance or opposition to what is believed to be the researchers’ hypothesis. This is 
particularly problematic when the subjects are college students, which is often the case (cf. 
Anderson et al., 2007), since they – especially psychology students – are more likely to reflect 
on the purpose, methodology and potentially undisclosed aspects of the experiment. 
3. Intervening experiences: Even if virtual violence fosters aggressive behaviour, it is clearly just 
one among many factors, as discussed above. For this reason, it becomes extremely difficult to 
conduct longitudinal studies due to the multitude of intervening experiences. Longitudinal 
studies also tend to suffer from high dropout rates, which undermines the initial 
randomization. Thus, there are few if any published longitudinal studies that isolate video game 
effects on aggression (cf. Anderson et al., 2007, p. 33ff) so experiments on the effects of virtual 
violence focus almost exclusively on short-term effects. There is also some research that 
supports the intuitively plausible supposition that emotions primarily determine short-term 
effects, whereas long-term effects are more influenced by rational deliberation (cf. Anderson, 
2004). 
4. Measurement problems: For practical and ethical reasons, the effects of virtual violence 
cannot be experimentally measured by monitoring subjects engaging in actual violence. 
Instead, many researchers have tried to find alternative means of measuring increased 
aggression. One of the most common laboratory measures of aggression is to let the subject 
administer “a noxious blast of white noise” (Anderson & Dill, 2000, p. 776) to another person.  
These measurements have been widely criticized as too artificial to draw any general 
conclusions (see e.g. Kutner & Olson, 2008).2 Closely related, measurements of aggression have 
not been widely standardized, making it difficult to perform meta-analyses. 
5. Aggression vs. excitement: There is little doubt that video games, even those without any 
virtual violence, can create a high degree of excitement in the player. Thus, it can be difficult to 
decide whether the measured behaviour (e.g. higher noise blasts) is due to increased level of 
excitement or increased level of aggression.  
6. Ethical problems: The ethical problem mentioned above does not only give rise to 
measurement problems, but in a catch-22 manner, the experiments would seem to be 
unethical if the hypotheses are verified. That is, if there really is a risk that being exposed to 
virtual violence leads to dramatic changes in behaviour, then it might be questioned whether 
these experiments can be ethically justified in the first place.  
 
It is not my purpose to argue that experiments dealing with the effects of virtual violence are 
necessarily flawed. Indeed, Craig Anderson has done much to show that these methodological 
problems can be overcome. 3 Rather, the source of many of the intervening variables that raise 
doubt about the validity of these experiments lies in the individuals’ capacity for rational 
deliberation. That is, accounts stating that virtual violence leads to immoral emotional dispositions 
rarely take into account our ability to reason about our emotions. The experiments 
methodologically presuppose to varying degrees the emotivist premise that “reason is … the slave 
of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them” (Hume, 
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 There have been studies that, in turn, try to correlate the administration of noise blasts with aggressive behaviour (see 
e.g. Anderson & Bushman, 1997), but these studies appear to inherit many of the same methodological problems. 
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 See especially Anderson et al (2007). See also Anderson (2003) [retrieved January 2009, from   
http://www.apa.org/science/psa/sb-anderson.html], which contains a concise overview and further references. 
1739/2008, p. 297). It seems reasonable to assume that behaviour and moral judgments stem from 
a combination of emotional dispositions and rational deliberation – and few researchers would 
argue that emotions constitute the whole story. Thus, it is the relative importance of the two that 
distinguishes rationalist from emotivist accounts. Although admittedly speculative, it also seems 
reasonable to assume that we are more likely to engage in rational deliberation when our intuitions 
are not immediately applicable to the case at hand, or if our intuitions are conflicting; that we are 
more likely to react intuitively and without proper deliberation when the case at hand closely 
resembles familiar experiences. If this is the case, the puzzling and often bizarre nature of many 




CASUISTICS AS DESCRIPTIVE MODEL OF MORAL JUDGMENT 
One reason why it is difficult to propose descriptive, rationalist accounts of the formation of moral 
judgment is that there is no one way in which all people reason. Thus, I will choose one method of 
reasoning and try to show how that kind of reasoning is affected by different experiences. For the 
sake of the argument, I will use as a starting point the premise that one influential way of reasoning 
about moral problems is sound case-based reasoning – or what is sometimes known as casuistics. 
Thus, I will use casuistics as a descriptive model, i.e. a model that aims to describe, rather than 
prescribe, the formation of moral judgments. Some will argue that a descriptive casuistic model, 
especially one that builds on sound principles for case-based reasoning, is overly optimistic and 
presents an idealized version of moral judgment not found in most persons. Although this is 
probably true in many cases, my claim does not entail that all people form moral judgments in this 
manner. The condition is merely that we can deliberate in such a manner and that some people do, 
some of the time.4 If this is the case, it is worth considering how moral judgments might be altered 
by a process of informed reasoning over new experiences and paradigmatic cases.  
‘Casuistics’ is a generic term that covers different forms of case-based reasoning. Central to 
casuistics is the use of paradigmatic cases as a starting point. In short, a morally problematic case is 
compared to morally unproblematic cases, and the ethically relevant similarities are analyzed in 
order to figure out whether the judgment of the paradigmatic case is valid also for the problematic 
case. To use abortion as an example, the moral justification of such an act can be analyzed in terms 
of its similarities with cases in which most reasonable persons would agree that killing a living being 
is justifiable and cases in which it is not. By weighing the relevant similarities and differences 
against each other, we can come to a more informed decision regarding the ethical justification of 
abortion. 
The advantage of casuistics is its ability to take a range of situational factors into 
consideration, thereby avoiding the rigidity of universal principles. Since the paradigmatic case 
should ideally be agreed upon from the perspective of any ethical theory, as well as different 
ideological and religious backgrounds, it can also be seen as a promising means of reaching 
agreement across cultural, political and religious divides. As long as we agree upon the 
paradigmatic case and the principles for sound case-based reasoning, the discussion can focus on 
ethically relevant properties rather than abstract ethical theories or more or less non-rational 
worldviews. One of its main problems is that it can be difficult to find paradigmatic cases – cases 
upon which most reasonable persons are likely to agree. After all, reasonable persons disagree on a 
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 Incidentally, Jonsen and Toulmin mention that the reason for attempting to revive casuistry in their seminal The Abuse of 
Casuistry (1988) was because they realized that they were already thinking in casuistic terms; They ‘were independently 
struck by aspects of [their previous] methods and results that were hard to account for in terms of current ethical theory’ 
(1988, p. vii). It should also be mentioned that casuistics occupy a central role in computer ethics, as reflected in the oft-
cited definition of computer ethics by James Moor: ‘A typical problem in computer ethics arises because there is a policy 
vacuum about how computer technology should be used’ (Moor, 1985, p. 266) – the policy vacuum being due to difficulty 
finding paradigmatic cases.  
number of things. Another problem is to discern which properties are (most) ethically relevant and 
to what degree these properties are shared by the problematic case at hand.  
Furthermore, there are two main forms of casuistry, case-to-case and case-norm-case.5 In 
case-to-case reasoning, we choose one or more paradigmatic cases with which the case at hand is 
compared. In case-norm-case reasoning, moral norms are established on the basis of an inductive 
inference from paradigmatic cases, and the application of these norms is done on the basis of 
deduction from the general norm to the case at hand. ‘Inference’ and ‘deduction’ is not to be taken 
in a strict logical sense, but rather in accordance to the various principles for sound reasoning (see 
below). In this sense, the case-norm-case approach has much in common with John Rawls’ 
reflective equilibrium (Rawls, 1999) where cases and norms are reflected upon and revised in light 
of each other. Although the case-to-case and case-norm-case models have much in common, the 
main difference is that the use of norms as an intermediary can foster the method of reflective 
equilibrium and requires coherency between a larger set of cases than in case-to-case reasoning. 
What the different forms of casuistry have in common, at least as a normative model, is a set 
of rules and principles for how to extend moral judgment between cases and/or norms. The 
overarching principle is what is sometimes known as the principle of formal equality, which can be 
formulated as follows: Cases that are relevantly similar should be treated (or judged) in a similar 
manner; a differential treatment requires a relevant difference (cf. Thommessen & Wetlesen, 2003, 
p. 242). The relevant difference in question is a difference in the set of ethically relevant properties. 
Thus, sound case-based reasoning entails: 1) find paradigmatic cases with which the case at hand 
can be compared, 2) discern the ethically relevant properties in the paradigmatic case, and 3) 
analyze whether these properties can be found in the problematic case at hand to a sufficient 
degree. If we take animal ethics, for instance, we can argue as follows: 1) All reasonable persons 
agree that it is prima facie wrong to willingly inflict pain on another human being, 2) the ethically 
relevant property in the paradigmatic case is sentience, i.e. the ability to feel pain,6 and 3) we have 
good reasons to believe that a horse is capable of feeling pain (due to having a similar central 
nervous system and pain-like behaviour). Hence, sentience is a sufficient, if not necessary, 
condition for extending our moral judgment from the paradigmatic case (humans) to the case at 
hand (horses). In other words, there is not an ethically relevant difference between humans and 
horses when it comes to inflicting pain.7 In reaching this conclusion, we can then form or revise our 
moral norms in light of that judgment. For instance, the resulting norm would be that, prima facie, 
it is morally wrong to cause pain to any being that is likely to be sentient. Judgment regarding other 
problematic cases can then lead us to further revise and refine that moral norm, for instance by 
reflecting on cases such as embryos, animals with no central nervous systems, humans with 
Congenital Insensitivity to Pain Syndrome and so forth. 
Perhaps the most central aspect of casuistry, and what separates sound casuistry from its 
abuse, is the requirement that we cannot reach any conclusion we want simply by focusing on the 
properties that are conducive to the conclusion we wish to reach. I believe this can be emphasized 
by relating casuistry more closely to discourse ethics, and require it to be twice intersubjective. 
That is, we take cases upon which most reasonable persons would agree as a starting point, and 
our arguments concerning the ethically relevant similarities between this case and the case at hand 
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 Sentience is Peter Singer’s criterion in arguing that animals should be ascribed a similar moral status as that of humans 
(Singer, 1990). 
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 This similarity entails that it is prima facie wrong to inflict pain on horses, but it does not prevent us from having a 
hierarchy in which this is less wrong than inflicting pain on a human being. See Wetlesen (1999) and Søraker (2007) for two 
theories of moral status in which beings are ascribed different degrees of moral status in light of their relevant similarities 
with moral persons. 
must make sense to any reasonable person – beyond non-rational beliefs.8 Thus, the starting point 
and ultimate guiding principle ought to be agreement among reasonable and well-informed 
persons. In the words of Habermas, “practical discourse is not a procedure for generating justified 
norms but a procedure for testing the validity of norms that are being proposed and hypothetically 
considered for adoption” (Habermas, 1990, p. 103). This also restricts the ethically relevant 
properties to empirical and theoretical notions, excluding arguments that cannot be subjected to 
discursive testing in this manner. 
As can be seen from the examples above, casuistry is not a direct route to certainty, but at 
the very least, it allows us to focus on the important questions, and it provides a common platform 
for discussion. As a descriptive model of how we might deliberate about our moral norms, it can 
help us understand how we might come to change our moral norms and corresponding behaviour 
in light of being confronted with new experiences. I will now turn to how certain virtual 
experiences might, through a process of casuistic deliberation, change our moral norms. I will focus 
on the controversial notion of ‘virtual rape’ and its possible impact on moral norms regarding rape 
in general.9 
 
WHAT IS A ‘VIRTUAL RAPE’? 
In a much-debated paper originally published in 1993, Julian Dibbell describes what is commonly 
referred to as the first virtual rape. The event is difficult to comprehend unless one is familiar with 
different kinds of virtual worlds. Dibbell describes his initial reaction to the phenomenon: 
 
I was still the rankest of newbies then … still too unsteady to make the leaps of faith, logic, 
and empathy required to meet the spectacle on its own terms. I was fascinated by the 
concept of virtual rape, but I couldn't quite take it seriously. (Dibbell, 2007, p. 21) 
 
But, when Dibbell describes the personas and the events that happened in a virtual world called 
LambdaMoo one night, it soon becomes clear that the differences and, albeit weak, similarities 
between a virtual and a real rape cuts to the very essence of what it is – and might become – to 
immerse oneself in virtual worlds. As Dibbell later notes, “Where before I'd found it hard to take 
virtual rape seriously, I now was finding it difficult to remember how I could ever not have taken it 
seriously” (Dibbell, 2007, p. 27).  
The main details are roughly as follows. In a virtual world, the inhabitants are represented by 
avatars, i.e. graphical representations through which the participants act, speak and portray more 
or less consistent identities.10 A virtual rape entails that someone takes control over your avatar, 
the representation of you in a virtual world, and forces your avatar to engage in acts that you never 
would consent to. In particular, this includes extreme forms of self-mutilation and perverse sexual 
activities. The avatar, which you normally use to channel speech and actions according to how you 
wish to present yourself, is forced into doing these activities while you and all bystanders witness 
the events helplessly. Importantly, the bystanders have no way of knowing – and little reason to 
assume – that the offensive behaviour is not controlled by the same user as before.  
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 There have been a number of other philosophical studies of virtual experiences that, implicitly or explicitly, employ a 
casuistic approach. See e.g. Morgan Luck (2009) for a very interesting, casuistic analysis of virtual murder and virtual 
paedophilia. 
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 In Dibbell’s case, the virtual world was purely text-based and the avatars were only nicknames with short descriptions, 
but similar events have been known to happen in graphical virtual worlds as well – even cases that have been reported as 
such to the police (cf. http://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/commentary/sexdrive/2007/05/sexdrive_0504, Retrieved 
January 3, 2009). 
To someone unfamiliar with virtual worlds and presenting yourself through an avatar, this 
might seem like a trivial affair. The problem is that the way in which users relate to their avatars 
differ enormously, ranging from casual detachment to a complete blurring of oneself and one’s 
representation. In order to understand how such actions can be interpreted as equivalent to rape, 
keep in mind that some individuals dedicate the majority of their social life to online role playing, 
that they have invested many years in creating a consistent, trustworthy and virtuous character in 
order to overcome the lack of physical presence, and that all of those efforts can be annihilated by 
one single instance of having one’s avatar commit the unspeakable acts in question. Keep also in 
mind that these forced acts are witnessed by your closest friends and that there is often no way in 
which to submit proof that you were in fact under the control of someone else.11 Your name is 
damaged for always, trust and friendships dissolve, feelings of shame, humiliation and lost 
autonomy ensue.  
Describing the events as a ‘rape’ seemed to be an attempt to find some real life concept that 
could give meaning to why the main victims and the spectators found themselves shocked and 
overwhelmed by their own reactions. The use of the concept was not the result of one person’s 
over-reaction. Even the bystanders who had never before experienced virtual rape “immediately 
appreciated its gravity and were moved to condemnation of the perp” (Dibbell, 2007, p. 17). 
‘Virtual rape’ was already, and still is, commonly invoked to describe these kinds of events. The 
main victim of the Dibbell case, in real life a “theory-savvy doctoral candidate” (Dibbell, 2007, p. 17) 
described that as she was trying to make sense of what had happened “she was surprised to find 
herself in tears – a real-life fact that should suffice to prove that the words' emotional content was 
no mere fiction” (Dibbell, 2007, p. 16). Still, given the apparent differences between actual and 
virtual rape, can our moral judgment of the virtual rape in any way be informed by paradigmatic 
judgments of actual rape? 
 
 ‘VIRTUAL RAPE’ AS SEEN FROM A RATIONALIST, CASUISTIC ACCOUNT 
One of the reasons for choosing ‘rape’ as an example is that any rational being would intuitively 
and forcefully condemn a clear case of rape as ethically wrong. At the same time, opinions differ 
widely on the notion of ‘virtual rape’. Hence, this is a typical casuistic challenge where it is difficult 
to understand whether our judgment of the paradigmatic case is relevant to the problematic case 
at hand. One of the main reasons for this problem is that it is notoriously difficult to discern exactly 
what it is that makes something a rape – what the ethically relevant properties are. If we do not 
consider the mindset and consent of the parties involved, there is in some cases no way in which to 
ascertain whether it is a rape or not. This is of course the reason why rape, unfortunately, is one of 
the most difficult cases to prove in court. Most kinds of physical acts can be consensual and 
desired. Likewise, experiencing something as a rape is not sufficient or necessary for calling it a 
rape. How we experience something is highly subjective and can be altered by drugs or past 
experiences. For instance, if someone does not recollect having been raped, this does not entail 
that a rape did not take place. In other words, the problem with defining rape stems from the fact 
that ‘it is in part mind-dependent and ontologically subjective.  
Given the sensitivity of the subject matter, it is important to be precise about what this 
entails. John Searle (1995) has argued that there is a world of difference between epistemological 
and ontological subjectivity, and that the latter often entail epistemologically objective facts. For 
instance, the fact that particular pieces of paper count as legal tender in a given country cannot be 
wholly described in terms of physical properties alone; it is in part determined by the beliefs held 
by a number of people. In other words, it is an ontologically subjective fact, but this does not entail 
that it is a matter of mere subjective preference. The fact that pieces of paper of a particular layout 
count as legal tender in the context of the United States is ontologically subjective but 
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 Although many find it tempting to point out that living the majority of your life online and having only online friends is 
unhealthy in itself, a view that itself rests on a number of controversial assumptions, this does not remove, neither should 
it devalue, the emotional distress caused by such events.  
epistemologically objective; if you disagree you are quite simply mistaken. Thus, we have a range of 
different kinds of facts ranging from those that are ontologically and epistemologically objective 
(e.g. that there is gravitational force between the moon and the earth), those that are ontologically 
subjective yet epistemologically objective (e.g. that the piece of paper in my hand counts as legal 
tender), and those that are ontologically and epistemologically subjective (e.g. that I find Munch to 
be my favourite painter). Thus, although rape is not ontologically objective in the same manner 
that gravitational force is, it is certainly not epistemologically subjective in the same manner as my 
taste in paintings. Still, part of the meaning of rape is ontologically subjective, or mind-dependent. 
This does in no way detract from its seriousness, quite the contrary, but it is what makes it more 
difficult to define than murder and other crimes.12 
The fact that ‘rape’ is to some degree ontologically subjective allows us to better understand 
how it can be applied to events in virtual worlds. As argued by Philip Brey (2003), some entities that 
are socially constructed in the manner outlined above can be ontologically reproduced in virtual 
worlds. For instance, no particular physical properties are needed for something to be money; sea 
shells, paper, metal discs, and electronically stored digits have all been recognized as money and, in 
many cases, can be traded against each other without loss of value. The same lack of physical 
requirements can be found in other ‘institutional entities’, to use Searle’s phrase, such as the game 
of chess, contracts, institutions and elections. All of these can, and have been, ontologically 
reproduced in virtual worlds because the lack of physical properties in virtual worlds is not a 
hindrance to their reproduction. Entities that do require particular physical properties, such as 
trees, mountains and cars, cannot be ontologically reproduced but at best simulated in virtual 
worlds. Finally, there are a number of entities that do not require particular physical properties for 
their existence, but where particular physical properties are regarded by many as important to 
their value or disvalue. For instance, there are numerous churches in virtual worlds and ‘church’ is 
an ontologically subjective construct, illustrated by the fact that physical churches come in 
countless different sizes and shapes. Still, many would argue that a church cannot be wholly 
reproduced in a virtual world, because the physical properties of a physical church (say, a medieval 
cathedral with monumental stained glass windows and spandrels) is important to the experience – 
what Borgmann (1999) refers to as the “commanding presence” of actual reality. What about rape? 
Are particular physical events, or states of affairs, necessary for something to be a rape, and 
consequently ontologically non-reproducible in virtual worlds? In particular, are violations of the 
physical body necessary for something to be judged as a rape? 
In case-norm-case casuistics, this is where we encounter a reflective equilibrium between 
the case at hand and our moral norms. If we hold that ‘virtual rape’ is not a form of rape, we 
(indirectly) hold that some kind of bodily violation (or some other condition that cannot be met in 
virtual worlds) is a necessary requirement for judging something to be a rape. If we do hold that 
‘virtual rape’ really is a minor form of rape, we indirectly assume that bodily violation is not a 
necessary requirement for judging something to be a rape. Furthermore, if we are to act 
consistently and revise our moral norms in accordance with sound principles for case-based 
reasoning, we would need to revise our moral norms regarding rape so as to either exclude or 
include instances of non-virtual rape where no bodily violation takes place. We are then left with 
either a more exclusive or inclusive notion of rape that carries over into real life judgments. In other 
words, this would be a form of case-norm-case reasoning in which the virtual case might prompt a 
revision to our norms, which in turn might change our judgment of cases in the physical world – 
and this is how virtual cases might change our reasoning about actual cases. The conclusion might 
be the same as an emotivist account, but the explanations are radically different. Consider: 
 
Possible emotivist explanations: If our moral norm regarding rape becomes more inclusive due to 
experiencing virtual rape, this is due to being made more emotionally aware of rape-like acts. If our 
moral norm regarding rape becomes more exclusive, this is due to a desensitisation of our 
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emotions regarding rape-like acts. 
 
Possible rationalist, casuistic explanations: If our moral norm regarding rape becomes more 
inclusive, this is due to rationally recognizing that bodily violation is not a necessary requirement 
for something to be a rape. If our moral norm regarding rape becomes more exclusive, this is due 
to rationally recognizing that bodily violation is necessary for something to be a rape.13 
 
It is not my concern to prescribe which conclusion we ought to reach. The main lesson is that the 
two accounts lead to radically different questions and explanations. On an emotivist account, the 
question is: in what way are your emotions regarding rape altered by experiencing virtual rape? On 
a rationalist, casuistic account, the question becomes, for instance: do you regard bodily violation 
as a necessary requirement for something to be a rape? The former, especially if we regard 
emotion as an instinctive source of moral judgments, can primarily be measured through 
observation of behaviour. Can we measure these changes on the basis of a rationalist account? It 
should be possible to design experiments on the basis of a rationalist account as well, where 
deliberation on a particular topic is measured in subjects that have and have not been subjected to 
different kinds of virtual experiences. For instance, Stromer-Galley has developed a coding scheme 
for describing the process and content of deliberation (Stromer-Galley, 2007). Such experiments 
can also be set up inside the virtual world itself. Thus, research carried out from a rationalist 
perspective could help us gain a more holistic and nuanced understanding of the effects of virtual 
violence – not only its effect on our emotions but also on our deliberation, not only on children but 
on rational adults as well. Furthermore, it could give important insights into how virtual violence in 
different forms ought to be portrayed and contextualized in order to prompt rational deliberation 
that could counter changes to our emotional dispositions.  
It is important to emphasize that even if virtual violence might foster deliberation, this is not 
in itself a justification of excessive virtual violence. In particular, some games portray nothing but 
disrespectful and perverted views of humanity – such as the controversial game Rapelay where the 
only objective is to engage in acts of virtual rape and other forms of male domination. There is also 
little doubt that children are more likely to suffer negative effects from virtual violence, precisely 
because they will often lack the ability to rationally deliberate over their experiences. Thus, I also 
agree that there should be content rating systems to classify games into age-related groups. 
However, on the presupposition that virtual violence is unlikely to be purged from games and 
virtual worlds targeted at adolescents and adults, my hope is that increased focus on rational 
deliberation could be used to urge virtual world and video game developers to frame virtual 
violence in a manner that fosters deliberation. In purely pragmatic terms, 14 it is more likely that 
developers will adopt the idea of adding compelling storylines to their games than that they will rid 
their products of virtual violence. Virtual violence probably sells more games, but adding elements 
that foster deliberation can make the games both better and more profitable  – as evidenced by 
the fact that most game classics and best sellers, although sometimes violent, do employ intricate 
plots and intellectually challenging scenarios.15 If it is the case that we are more likely to engage in 
rational deliberation when confronted with experiences where our pre-formed intuitions cannot be 
readily applied, where our intuitions conflict in interesting ways, or when we have particularly 
strong reactions to certain characters and events,16 then a better understanding of these factors 
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 See MacKinnon (2006) for an interesting discussion of how the notion of virtual rape might change our rational 
deliberation regarding rape in general. 
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 See Søraker (2006) for a general defence of the use of ‘pragmatic arguments’ when principled arguments are unlikely to 
gain support. 
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 To take but a few examples, the Sims, Grand Theft Auto and Final Fantasy series are among the best selling games of all 
time, and they are all intellectually challenging and employ intriguing plots. 
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 As one of the anonymous referees made me aware, there is a related and potentially useful discussion in philosophy of 
literature concerning the so-called "paradox of emotional response to fiction". The paradox stems from the fact that we 
often have strong emotional and rational reactions to certain fictional characters and events despite the fact that they are 
could be one way of countering negative effects on our emotional dispositions – one way of 
fostering resilience to the risks demonstrated by emotivist psychological research.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The rationalist, casuistic account of the effects of virtual violence allows us to ask a different set of 
questions than emotivist accounts. Rather than asking how our moral emotions are changed, the 
question becomes how our moral reasoning changes. That is, personal experiences and 
paradigmatic cases are seen as providing new factors to take into consideration when deliberating 
over our moral norms. Although I have focussed on ‘virtual rape’ and only given a rough overview 
of how such a model can be applied, I believe that more research should be done on how these 
questions can be answered within rationalist frameworks. Such models underline that there is no 
deterministic relation between virtual violence and aggressive, immoral behaviour – and that our 
moral judgments can be altered by other means than emotional distress, trauma, desensitisation 
and the like. This does not in any way entail that psychological experiments carried out on the basis 
of emotivist assumptions have no value, but that more effort should be put into devising 
experiments that take rational deliberation into account as well – even if this means that the 
results cannot be quantified. It also entails that researchers should not exclusively focus on the 
effects on children, but consider how virtual violence might affect rational, consenting adults as 
well. Finally, and the most important plea in this paper, this calls for more interdisciplinary research 
in which psychologists, philosophers, neuroscientists, sociologists, computer scientists, statisticians, 
game developers and other researchers more actively collaborate towards a more nuanced debate. 
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